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During the last two decades, we have seen a wave of literature on 
the East Asian Newly Industrializing Countries (NICs). The majority 
of this literature is oriented towards the superior industrial 
performance of the East Asian NICs compared with other 
developing countries. In addressing this issue, the present article 
focusses on analytical and theoretical issues. It largely leaves out the 
empirical evidence and is more concerned with questions than 
answers. The answers that are given try to encapsulate what we 
already (think we) know, while the questions, hopefully, point out 
some of the areas where we ought to focus our future research in 
order to get a better understanding of the East Asian capitalist 
"miracles". The paper will not cover all possible types and levels of 
explanation but will concentrate on such factors as political and 
societal institutions. In the last section, however, a broader variety 
of determinants, including the external determinants, are discussed. 
Beyond Import Substitution: Export-Led Development 
The mainstream neoclassical debate on the NICs in the 1970s and 
1980s was mainly concerned with the general superiority of 
outward-looking over inward-looking strategies (export-oriented 
industrialization over import substitution) and market-oriented 
strategies over state-led strategies. In the debate, the central focus 
was on the efficient allocation of resources. Following the theory of 
comparative advantages, it was argued that an outward-oriented 
trade regime would lead to a low level of price distortion which in 
turn would result in maximization of the rate of long-term growth. 
These neoclassical arguments, however, have both theoretical and 
empirical shortcomings. 
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First, although there have been attempts to supplement this 
basically static approach with a dynamic perspective which should 
link export and freer markets to economic growth and development, 
the theoretical foundation is certainly frail.' Moreover, various 
studies have questioned the empirical evidence supporting the 
proposition that an outward-oriented trade policy is causally linked 
with the degree of price distortion and with superior economic 
growth.' Finally, several studies have demonstrated that the East 
Asian NICs (South Korea and Taiwan in particular) have been much 
less outward-oriented in their trade policy than claimed in the 
neoclassical literature. The level of protection was not particularly 
low and neither industry neutrality nor trade neutrality was 
pre~alent .~ 
A particular aspect of the above mentioned debate has to do with 
the role of the state in industrial development. In general export-led 
growth was seen as combined with minimal state intervention. This 
aspect was highlighted in the neoclassical political economy 
literature of the 1980s which converted the neoclassical anti-import 
substitution critique into an anti-interventionist discourse, in which 
state failures were seen as predominant and worse than market 
failures, and in which market failures were considered as almost 
exclusively policy induced. It further supported the argument for 
export-oriented strategies. Thus, it was asserted that export-oriented 
activities were not subject to rent-seeking activities. Apart from the 
fact that the relative size and significance of market failures versus 
government failures is an empirical question, the link between 
particular trade strategies on the one hand and rent-seeking on the 
other hand has so far been postulated rather than ~ubstantiated.~ 
Still, the East Asian NICs constitute a puzzle in the neoclassical 
universe. In the recent literature which goes beyond the market, this 
puzzle has been solved by arguing that the East Asian economies 
have intervened market-friendly, i.e., have disciplined their 
interventions with international and domestic competition; have 
intervened competently, pragmatically and flexibly; have intervened 
in a non-distortingly way; and finally have intervened moderately 
and openly, following "rules rather than official di~cretiori."~ 
Radical globalist writings have accepted the starting point that the 
economic success of the East Asian NICs is linked to the shift to 
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export-led growth but criticize the voluntarist tone among the 
neoclassical  economist^.^ It has been argued that the "success of the 
East Asian NICs rested not only on certain discrete policies but on 
the particular political and institutional context that allowed the 
NICs to adopt those policies in the first p la~e . "~  In explaining the 
different choices of strategy in Latin America and East Asia, several 
explanations have been put forward. According to Mahon, we can 
distinguish between: explanations which are based upon the 
character and relative weight of interests in civil society; 
explanations which put emphasis on state autonomy vis-8-vis 
societal interests; explanations which stress the international 
pressures and the severity of payment crisis; and finally, 
explanations which focus on structural and hence political obstacles 
to exporting low-wage manufactured goods.8 
From the above brief review of some of the literature which 
makes cross-regional comparisons between East Asia NICs and (in 
particular) Latin American countries, we can observe that the 
political economy of industrialization is becoming a key area in the 
debate. A major weakness in this type of literature is the uncritical 
acceptance of the neoclassical starting point, i.e., that the main 
difference in industrial performance between Latin America and 
East Asia has to do with the superiority of export-oriented over 
import substitution industrialization. This point of departure is 
explicitly put forward by Haggard: 
The crucial difference between industrialization in East Asian 
and Latin American NICs is the difference between 
industrialization through export and import substitution; a 
central puzzle is to examine the conditions under which the 
East Asian countries adopted and sustained the policy reforms 
that produces export-led g r ~ w t h . ~  
Although export of manufactures is common to all of the four East 
Asian NICs, one should not refrain from asking the following 
questions: How important and how significant was the shift from 
import substitution (ISI) to export-orientation (EOI) in the early 
1960s? What is meant by a shift from IS1 to EOI? Does it refer to a 
shift in the net overall balance of incentives for production directed 
to the domestic market versus export, or does it refer to a shift in 
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trade shares, i.e., the share of trade/export in GDP? Furthermore, 
to what extent was East Asia's fast growth and fairly equitable 
income distribution a result of export-led growth, i.e., caused by 
export growth? 
On the one hand, one can question the proposition that there was 
significant change in the early 1960s towards economic liberaliza- 
tion, i.e., towards an open, outward-oriented and market-led 
strategy. In both South Korea and Taiwan, a non-neutral trade 
regime was prevalent and both governments promoted and even 
forced private producers to export. In South Korea, the state used 
both the carrot and the stick to push exports, one main mechanism 
being to give access to the profitable domestic markets in exchange 
for improved export performance.1° Similarly, in Taiwan, export was 
supported but in ways that differed significantly from free trade or 
neutral trade regimes.'' 
On the other hand, although one should not ignore the vital 
importance of domestic demand expansion for economic growth, 
export of manufactures has been important for economic 
development in both Taiwan and South Korea. Export of 
manufactures became a vital source of foreign exchange, and to a 
great extent the East Asian NICs did not just import in order to 
export but exported in order to import. Particularly in Korea, export 
industries constituted a means of converting unskilled labour into 
sophisticated imports. Moreover, export also served to relieve the 
demand constraint in the fairly small domestic market (in Taiwan). 
Finally, export undoubtedly disciplined firms to improve their 
product quality, and increased labour utilization, thus leading to a 
higher market pressure on wages. 
Therefore, the question is not whether export was important for 
industrial development in Taiwan and South Korea but whether it 
really was the key factor. Furthermore, we have to keep in mind 
that export of manufactures might have been a result of, rather than 
the reason why output increased. 
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Beyond the Market : State-Led Development 
As there are good reasons to believe that trade policy orientation 
and trade orientation per se are not dominant determinants of 
growth and structural transformation, it is not surprising that more 
emphasis has been put on the qualitative aspects of state 
intervention, i.e., the extent to which policies are implemented as 
originally formulated (hardness and softness of policies). The 
theoretical challenge then is not to explain policy differences or the 
degree of state intervention but to explain the effectiveness of state 
intervention. Jenkins has argued: 
The key to superior industrial performance of the East Asian 
NICs ... is rather the ability to direct the accumulation process 
in the direction which is required by the capitalist 
development at a particular point in time which is crucial.12 
In this structuralist-statist perspective, effective state intervention is 
considered a necessary condition for successful industrial 
development. The change towards growth and structural 
transformation that leads to the rise of skill and high-value added 
industries, which are able in the long run to compete in the 
domestic market and internationally on cost and product quality, 
requires more than market signals, and the state is considered as the 
only entity with sufficient resources, coercive power and legitimacy 
to make that type of beyond-the-market interventions. 
Robert Wade has described the central economic mechanism of 
the capitalist developmental state by referring to a combination of 
"the use of state power to raise the economy's investible surplus; 
insure that a high portion is invested in productive capacity within 
the national territory; guide investments into industries that are 
important for the economy's ability to sustain higher wages in the 
future; and expose the investment projects to international 
competitive pressure whether directly or indirectly.'13 
As mentioned above the main point is not about quantity but the 
quality of state intervention, and the type of state intervention that 
is referred to goes beyond both macro-economic policies which only 
affect overall demand, and functional industrial policies which aim 
at affecting a function across all/many industries.14 
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Four main features of a more strategic type of intervention are 
often referred to: selectivity, flexibility, coherence and competitive 
orientation. Selectivity, in that the state creates and supports 
progressively shifting competitive advantages instead of just 
adapting to existing comparative advantages. Flexibility, in the sense 
that the shifting international conjunctures and the shifting 
"windows of opportunity" in the world market demand a high 
adjustment capacity of the state. Coherence, in the sense that their 
impact is cumulative, Finally, competitive in the sense that policy 
promotes competitive production in enterprises.15 
The ability of the state to design and undertake such selective and 
directive interventions should not be taken for granted. Apart from 
the availability of sufficient and appropriate policy instruments, 
certain institutional or organizational requirements are important, and 
they constitute what has been named a developmental state. A 
developmental state is characterized by having internally a high 
level of bureaucratic capacity taking the form of a stable, well- 
developed, coherent, competent and non-corrupt bureaucracy; and 
by having externally both a high level of absolute autonomy from 
classes and groups which derive their wealth from unproductive 
(zero-sum) activities (or which are otherwise inimical to long term 
national capitalist industrial development) and a high level of 
relative autonomy from particular groups of industrial capitalists.16 
A variety of studies have dealt with the specific historical 
circumstances which have produced the political and institutional 
bases which in turn have contributed to a high level of autonomy 
and bureaucratic capacity in the East Asian NICs compared with 
the NICs in other regions.17 
Shifting the perspective from an inter-regional comparison of all 
NICs to an intra-regional comparison between the Asian NICs, one 
is confronted with the fact that although all states probably govern 
the market, they do so in different ways and with different 
methods. Obviously, South Korea has followed an aggressive 
industrial policy. In contrast, the KMT state in Taiwan has taken a 
more decentralized approach, utilizing large public upstream 
enterprises, state-sponsored R&D institutions and selected foreign 
investors to push the industrial transformation, and guiding 
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Taiwan's myriad of small and medium-sized enterprises through a 
set of incentives.'' 
In my opinion, the literature has documented that a statist 
approach has much more explanatory power than a market-oriented 
approach. Castells probably is correct in his analysis when he states 
that "behind the economic performance of the Asian Tigers breathes 
the dragon of the developmental state."19 
A developmental state perspective, however, is not without 
puzzles. For example, if a developmental state is so important for 
good economic performance, how has Hong Kong then developed 
without such a state? That anomaly has been attacked with 
reference to one or a combination of the following arguments : 
"Hong Kong is a special case"; "Hong Kong has done less well"; 
"Hong Kong is a developmental state due to its widespread 
intervention in the sphere of collective consumption, and due to the 
role played by large financial and commercial enterprises in 
cooperation with the colonial state elite."20 Leaving Hong Kong 
aside, we still need more knowledge about how Taiwan and South 
Korea have avoided government failures, that is, avoided disastrous 
and wasteful decisions and avoided the self-interested behaviour of 
bureaucrats. In short, if the state disciplines certain private actors 
and particular private enterprises, who, then, disciplines state 
actors? 
Moreover, one could ask whether the extent of state guidance is 
related to the "stage" of industrial development, the argument being 
that certain forms of competition involve more complex structural 
interdependencies and therefore require greater strategic capacity. 
Following Michael Porter, Bob Jessop has suggested a distinction 
between Ricardian, Kaldorian and Schumpeterian forms of 
competition and related types of states - Japan being closer to the 
latter form while Hong Kong tentatively is placed in the first 
category. The three different forms of competition are: First, the 
Ricardian, which is factor driven, i.e., depends on factor endowment 
and on the ability to minimize production costs with a given 
division of labour. Secondly, the Kaldorian form of competition 
which is investment-driven and rests on dynamic growth efficiency 
- a form "which relies on the dynamic causation of investment in 
the sectors or industries with high productivity growth and 
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expanding markets and involving making allocative decisions 
among available processes and products with regard to the likely 
repercussions of any (re-)allocation on economic gro~th ." '~  Thirdly, 
the Schumpeterian competitive strategy which is innovation driven 
and depends on a dynamic innovation efficiency, i.e., depends on 
particular process, product or organizational  innovation^.'^ 
Finally, we need more information on the extent to which and the 
mechanisms by which the state has guided the small and medium- 
sized enterprises. While South Korea with its tight big business-state 
interaction fits well into the developmental state framework the 
question remains as to what extent the Taiwanese state has been 
able to govern its plethora of small and medium-sized companies. 
In contrast to the neoclassical approach, which links the success of 
Taiwan to the small and medium-sized enterprises in downstream 
industries, the statist literature seems to have been concerned 
primarily with large-scale firms in upstream industries. The precise 
linkages between big and small enterprises, however, are not very 
well researched. 
Beyond Market and State: Institution-Led 
Development 
In contrast to statist approaches in political science, which try to 
bring politics back in by focussing on the state as the most 
significant institution and by "getting inside the state," the new 
institutionalism in sociology and theories of organization has been 
more concerned with societal institutions. The emergence of 
industrial winners are seen less as a result of diligent centralized 
planning than as a result of particular context sensitive factors, i.e., 
institutional and organizational factors as they have developed 
historically in different societies. 
In the new sociological institutionalism economic action is 
situated in a social context. Economic action is not carried out by 
"the economic man as a supersmart selfish individual without 
history and tradition, without enemies and  friend^."'^ People 
consider others when they do business. Economic action is 
embedded in ongoing networks of personal relationships. Networks 
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"refer to a regular set of contacts and similar social connections 
among individuals or g ro~ps ." '~  Thus, economic action is embedded 
in networks of institutionalized relationships - in routinized and 
organized procedures and ways of doing things. Moreover, as 
argued by Biggart, "the particular character of embeddedness - 
network of relations, social beliefs, gender and family structure and 
other institutionalized form of social order such as state and religion 
- will vary across s~c ie t ies . "~~ 
The relevance of new sociological institutionalism in relation to 
late industrialization is revealed in the comparative work of 
Hamilton, Biggart and Orru on structures of business ethics, 
networks of ownership and production, and the concrete 
arrangements which govern investment and trade in Japan, South 
Korea and Taiwan. All three countries have organizations and 
markets built upon principles of group and network which from a 
neoclassical perspective is normally interpreted as institutional 
"imperfections" or "distortions". The main aim of their analyses, 
however, is to disaggregate and explain the different qualities of 
these networks - the different organizing principles - that can be 
found in structures of business networks (and state-business 
networks) in these three countries. These differences, as illustrated 
in table 1 below, show: the Japanese communitarian principles of 
cooperative and relational contracting between equal and unequal 
partners organized around large, bank-financed group firms; the 
South Korean corporate patrimonialism organized around large 
family owned and state financed family groups - chaebols; and 
finally, the Taiwanese patrilineal logic of familial networks of usually 
informal or reinvestment financed family firms.26 
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Table 1. Business Structure and BusinessIState Relationships in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan 
Japan South Korea Taiwan 
State-business Cooperative 
relations partnership 
Principal corporate Inter-market groups 
actors 
Intra-firm Company ideologies; 
managerial strategies consensus building; 
peer group controls 
Extra-firm market High R&D; 
strategies manufacture and 
marketing of new 
products 
Political capitalism Separation of spheres 
Chaebol Family firms 
State Confucianism, "Family style" 
impersonal management; control 
management; strong, through personal ties 
centralized control 
High capital ventures Low capital; low 
in established R&D; manufacture of 
markets consumer 
expendables 
Source: Hamilton and Biggart 1991, 207. 
Moreover, these three different types of business network have all 
adapted well to the capitalist world market, and the table illustrates 
that (apart from such areas as electronics) they are not necessarily 
in competition with each other: 
Taiwan's system of small family firms, which can flexibly shift 
from producing one commodity to another, has become a 
dominant producer of an extensive range of medium-to-high- 
quality consumer goods (e.g., clothes, small household items) 
of the kind that fill the modern home and office but that 
require very little research and development. Large Japanese 
corporations specialize in a product area and, through 
research, development, and marketing strategies, attempt to 
create new commodities and consumers for those commodities 
... Exploiting their competitive advantage in technology and 
mass production, Japanese businesses operate on the frontier 
of product development. With the entire economy 
orchestrated by the state, South Korean business are 
36 Copenhagen Papers 8 .93  
State, institutions and industrial development in East Asian NICs 
attempting to become important producers of commodities 
that require extensive capital investment but for which 
markets already exist (e.g. steel, major construction materials, 
automobiles). Such ventures require large amounts of capital 
and coordination but relatively little research and 
de~elopment.'~ 
It is quite obvious that these different types of business network in 
the same cultural area cannot be explained by reference to universal 
economic laws and undifferentiated cost-benefit calculations or to 
abstract cultural uniformities. According to Hamilton and others, a 
clearer comprehension of how these organizational structures and 
practices came into being and how they are reproduced, requires a 
historical and context sensitive analysis showing how the 
preexisting interaction patterns or institutional principles have 
shaped these practices: 
Each economy rests on institutional principles that provide a 
coherent logic for competitive economic action. Socially 
constructed, accepted models of correct market behaviour 
shape interfirm relations, prompting firms to behave with and 
against each other in characteristically homogeneous ways. To 
be "technically" efficient, firms must consider and comply with 
the institutional setting in which they are embedded ... East 
Asian economies have prospered not because they have 
unilaterally adapted to technical environmental requirements, 
but because they have successfully institutionalized the 
principles of market activity suited to their socio-cultural 
environment and to their strategies of economic 
devel~pment .~~ 
The new economic sociology is mainly concerned with explaining 
different patterns of industrial organization and how they are 
shaped by the way firms are embedded in different institutional 
networks. As these networks are different in each society, they 
allow for activation of different organizational designs to achieve 
industrialization. 
A network approach seems to provide us with useful 
investigative tools. It allows us to understand the significant 
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differences between the South Korean state-guided oligopolistic type 
of capitalist industrialization and the Taiwanese type of flexible 
capitalism in which small and medium-sized enterprises have 
played a predominant role. A network approach allows us to look 
much more into the nature of production, distribution, and 
information networks. Further, it allows us to analyze Taiwanese 
industrialization along an ethnic dimension as a tension between the 
state-capitalist project of the KMT and the family enterprise strategy 
of the local Taiwanese. We are, however, also left with many open 
questions. 
First, one can question whether the three different patterns of 
business are just complementary strategies. We also have to look 
into the disadvantages of small family enterprises. In his analysis of 
the electronics industry, Mody shows that South Korean firms have 
a superior performance and he emphasizes the weaknesses in the 
Taiwanese small-scale appr~ach.'~ 
Second, we need to know more about the character of the highly 
developed division of labour and the related subcontracting 
networks both nationally and internati0nally.3~ 
Third, it is necessary to know more about the role of big business 
in Taiwan's subcontracting system, and particularly the role played 
by large upstream producers as input suppliers, capital suppliers, 
personnel suppliers and as marketing channels to and for 
downstream small and medium-sized firms?' 
Finally, realizing that the Taiwanese state has not followed a 
"hands off" strategy, we question the suggestion of the new 
sociological institutionalism that the successful growth of Taiwanese 
economy "has not taken place because of diligent, centralized 
planning; rather, it has occurred because of the entrepreneurship of 
the small and medium firms in the private sector, in the absence of 
strong incentives for growth ... I 132 
Towards a Framework of Analysis: Cluster of 
Institutions 
The present article has concentrated on the extent to which 
determinants of East Asia's or rather Taiwan's and South Korea's 
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development performance can be found in approaches of a market- 
oriented, state-oriented or institution-oriented kind. Before summing 
up, it may be useful to widen the scope of possible determinants. 
First, the rise and the success of the East Asian NICs cannot be 
analyzed in an international vacuum. Most scholars agree that 
several factors related to the world economy and the post-war inter-state 
system have favoured the Asian NICs. Among the favourable world 
market conditions one can mention world trade expansion; 
preferential access to the American market; relocation of production 
by American Multinational Corporations (MNC), partly as a 
response to the intensified Japanese penetration of the American 
market; and the role of Japan as a model for these countries. As a 
result of the post-war East Asian geo-politics these countries were 
given a special treatment. One aspect was foreign aid which played 
a special role in the process of primitive capital accumulation and 
agrarian transformation, and which in general strengthened the 
East Asian state elites relative to societal forces. In short, world 
system factors created a favourable set of conditions and 
opportunities for industrial "take-off. 
Second, the historical legacies and fhe initial conditions must be taken 
into account. The Japanese colonialism provided Taiwan and South 
Korea with favourable infrastructural, bureaucratic, educational and 
agricultural preconditions for industrial transformation. Moreover, 
such factors as limited national resource endowments and small 
internal markets should be taken into account when these countries 
are compared with large and resource-rich countries such as the 
Latin American NICs. Finally, one should be aware that Taiwan and 
South Korea probably did not qualify as typical underdeveloped 
countries in the 1950s - a fact which must have important 
implications for the lessons that can be drawn for other countries.33 
Third, the question is not whether culture is important, but how 
to integrate culture in analysis. One possibility is to focus at some 
static, fundamental, and abstract common values (such as 
Confucianism) and discuss how they affect individual behaviour 
and organizational patterns. Apart from the difficulties that arise 
when we have to explain cross-national or cross-regional differences 
in the same cultural area and differences over time plus the 
difficulties in identifying these values among people, such a strategy 
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normally tends to overlook that certain politico-economic 
developments often have formed contemporary "cultural 
phenomena". To illustrate this point: familism and 
entrepreneurialism in Taiwan is not just a reflection of the 
traditional Chinese values, but is also a result of KMT's politically 
motivated preference for small-scale local Taiwanese enterprises, 
KMT's policy of leaving reproduction to the family and the KMT 
nation building program.34 It might therefore be preferable to 
consider culture as something that is historically situated, affected 
by agency and power and mediated through certain  institution^.^^ 
Fourth, power, interests and social coalitions matter. The main focus 
in this paper has been on the state as an actor, but we have to 
acknowledge the relational character of state strength and study 
social forces in order to explain both state autonomy and the 
capacity of the state to implement particular policies. Thus, a study 
of the state as an actor must take into account the independent 
organizational, political and economic resources of social classes and 
groups and must look at the interplay of political forces and 
interests, and specify the coalitional structure or pacts of domination 
behind state intervention. 
If we want to avoid reducing the complex to the simple and the 
differentiated to the uniform, the above mentioned sets of 
explanatory variables cannot be left out. Nevertheless, this paper 
suggests that in order to obtain further insight into both the 
dynamics and the diversity of capitalist industrial development in 
East Asia, future research should more fully investigate the way in 
which particular institutions - encompassing both institutions-as- 
organization ("institutional arrangements") and institutions-as-rules- 
of-game ("institutional environments") - have shaped, limited and 
channeled social actions. 
There is no such thing as normal capitalist accumulation but only 
different trajectories and patterns of capitalist industrial 
development which are embedded in the local cultural and socio- 
political context. Interpretations of the East Asian NICs which 
consider them as market-led tend to abstract from and ignore these 
essential institutional aspects, while explanatory frameworks of both 
state-led and institutional-led kind tend to be much more sensitive 
to context, history and institutions. Interpretations of the statist 
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kind are forced to investigate the institutional requirements making 
effective state intervention possible, and approaches of the 
institution-led kind highlight the social fabric of investment, 
production and trade interaction and make it clear that microlevel 
institutions such as the family and social networks affect economic 
performance. 
The scope for institutional analysis, however, must be widened 
further. Sayer and Walker have suggested that one should study 
series of modes of organization. First, the basic triad covering the 
workplace, the firm and the market as institutions. Second, the 
middle ground covering a web of inter-firm alliances and networks 
(including family ties, associational links etc.) over, under and 
around firms and markets. Third, Sayer and Walker point at 
territories and nation states as important organizational entities at 
the final level of modes of industrial ~rganizat ion.~~ More precisely, 
Sayer and Walker says: 
Our second theme is that there exists a very wide range of 
modes of integration. Every branch of industry consists of 
nested and interpolated layers of social institutions, 
orchestrated through diverse points of control. Just as 
workplaces are systems of specialized work units, and the 
firms are systems of workplaces, so there are systems of firms, 
embedded in a delicate fabric of collaboration, contracts, 
ownership, families, and like. In addition regional and 
national systems of firms and networks, even system of states 
must be woven into the full web of industrial p r o d ~ c t i o n . ~ ~  
By widening the scope of institutional analysis, new aspects of East 
Asian capitalism come into focus. Although high profit rates in East 
Asia were immediately related to high levels of labour extraction, 
highly educated and productive labour, super-exploitation of young 
female workers and the related tight control over labour, the 
workplace and the "politics of production" is often ignored. 
Efficiently and profitably bringing together labour, materials and 
machinery cannot be taken for granted but must be explained by 
reference not only to labour repression but also to other types of 
labour control and integration. Burawoy's writings on factory 
regimes and Frederic Deyo's analysis of labour systems in East Asia 
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constitute valuable points of departure.38 In the case of South Korea, 
for example, more research on the workplace is needed to 
understand the contradictory interaction between authoritarian 
control, paternalistic management practices and some kind of 
workers' participation at the operational level of prod~ct ion.~~ 
Moreover, it is useful to look at the firm as an institution. In the 
case of South Korea, the structure and management of a business 
group must be taken into acc0unt,4~ and in the case of Taiwan, 
flexible management policies through interpersonal networks and 
the horizontal proliferation of the family enterprise must be given 
more notice.41 
Beyond workplace and firms we also need to know much more 
about various kinds of supply, production, export and marketing 
networks. Apart from what has already been mentioned, such an 
analysis might highlight the institutional requirement which made 
entry into new world markets possible. In the real world (which is 
different from the neoclassical textbook world) information on 
relevant suppliers, information on tastes, quality standards and 
marketing requirements cannot be taken for granted but must be 
explained by reference to state policy and institutional settings. 
Conclusion 
Capitalist industrialization never proceeds independently of the 
concrete institutional and historical context. This is true for East 
Asian industrialization as well as for industrialization experiences 
in the West. Generally, scholars who look at the East Asian NIC's 
from a market-led perspective tend to ignore this fact and favour 
more simple, uni-dimensional and ahistorical models which can 
easily be transferred to and emulated by other developing countries. 
As indicated, the present author intends to search for promising 
research avenues inside more institutional oriented approaches 
which look either at institutional aspects of the state or at societal 
institutions. Instead of seeing a fundamental tension between statist 
and societal oriented approaches, an institutional approach 
focussing on both state and societal institutions may prove more 
fruitful. What we should look for, however, is not single institutions 
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but clusters or ensembles of institutions and the way they are linked 
to particular patterns of industrialization and levels of economic 
performance. 
The developmental state debate has allowed us to "come inside 
the state" and has pointed out a set of institutional and 
organizational preconditions for effective state intervention. 
Similarly, the new institutional sociology and related studies have 
succeeded in "getting society back in1' - in getting the social fabric 
of production, distribution and consumption into focus. The link to 
production, however, is still a "missing link" and we are forced to 
ask still more questions: To what extent is market guidance a 
necessary condition for different types of industrial 
transformation and competition? To what extent are the 
organizational principles, highlighted in the new institutional 
sociology, country specific or sector specific or locality specific? 
These and other questions mentioned above must be explored in 
future research, if we wish to get beyond what we already (think 
we) know. 
Laurids S. Lauridsen, is Associate Professor, Institute of Geography and 
International Development Studies, Roskilde University, Denmark. 
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